

The Perfection of Democracy: Constitutional Design and the Theory of Mixed Government¹

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The Problem

When we say in ordinary conversation that a country is a democracy, we usually mean that the citizens of that country can use regularly scheduled elections to turn their leaders out of power. Call this "elementary democracy." Countries such as China or Cuba are not yet democracies because such elections are not yet available. In countries without elementary democracy, violence of some sort is usually required to remove those in power. Elementary democracy is such an obvious benefit to any human society that it is spreading rapidly throughout the world. The problem I deal with in this paper is what comes after elementary democracy has been achieved. How should democracy be perfected?

In countries that have been democracies for centuries and those where elementary democracy has recently been achieved, most of the problems of the perfection of democracy have their root in the exponential expansion of the number of citizens eligible to vote. In the United States, that number has grown from less than two million in 1790 to more than two hundred mil-

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lion in 1999, a one hundred fold increase. Japan's population of people eligible to vote is over ninety million. The European Union is wrestling with the problem of a "democratic deficit" in a voting population that is larger than the United States.³ In India there are more than six hundred million eligible voters. United States policy toward China is premised on the hope that China can become a democracy with one billion eligible voters. There are general problems to be solved of how these enormous entities can be democratically governed even after elementary democracy has been achieved. If the problems of the perfection of democracy cannot be solved in the United States with a voting population of two hundred million, they are not likely to be solved in India or China.

To understand what the problems of perfecting democracy are, I propose to use examples drawn from the constitutions and governing procedures of Japan and the United States, with occasional comparisons to the United Kingdom. These three countries are among the largest and most successful democracies in the world, yet each has problems with its political and constitutional structure that have emerged as major public issues. In Japan, a new election system has been put in place in an attempt to generate a two party system more responsive to public opinion and to strengthen a government chronically unable to make hard policy choices. In the United States, the devolution of power from the federal government to the individual states, and attempts to increase popular control of government by, for example, limiting the terms of office people can serve in Congress, have been major political issues. In the United Kingdom, devolution of power to Scotland and Wales, the need for a Bill of Rights, and the proper role of the monarchy and the House of Lords in contemporary Britain have become the focus of parliamentary action. In all three countries, the financing of political campaigns, the role of the media in politics, and the influence of "special interests" on public policy have been of central concern. The percentage of citizens participating

3. See Deirdre M Curtin, *Postnational Democracy: The European Union in Search of a Political Democracy* (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997) for a good discussion of the European Union's "democratic deficit."

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in elections has been declining, especially in the United States and Japan, the two largest countries, where citizen apathy and hostility to political processes and the national government are increasing.⁴

4. For Japan, see Susan J. Pharr, "Public Trust and Democracy in Japan," in *Why People Don't Trust Government*, ed. Nye, Zelikow, and King (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1997) pp. 237-252. Professor Pharr notes that the Japanese like their national government even less than Americans do, and the dislike has been constant in the post-war period, not just increasing recently as in the United States. The rest of this excellent collection of essays and empirical studies tries to determine the causes of American disaffection with government.

Survey data collected by political scientists in the United States documents the depth of American disaffection with their national government. See, for example, John R. Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, "Too Much of a Good Thing: More Representative is Not Necessarily Better," *PS: Political Science and Politics* 31 (1): pp. 29-30 (March, 1998).

"However, the public *does* want institutions to be transformed into something much closer to the people. The people sees a big disconnect between how they want representation to work and how they believe it is working. Strong support of populist government (not direct democracy) has been detected in innumerable polls during the last couple of decades. That the public looks favorably upon this process agenda is beyond dispute."

After listing some of the reforms such as a reduction in congressional salaries and term limitations, the authors continue,

"What ties these reforms together is the public's desire to make elected officials more like ordinary people. In focus groups we conducted at the same time as the survey, participants stated many times that elected officials in Washington had lost touch with the people. They supported reforms believed to encourage officials to start keeping in touch. Elected officials should balance the budget just like the people back home. Elected officials should live off modest salaries just like the people back home. And elected officials should face the prospect of getting a real job back home rather than staying in Washington for years and years. These reforms would force elected officials to understand the needs of their constituents rather than get swept up in the money and power that run Washington."

Curiously, after giving their evidence of apathy, discontent, and hostility, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse caution against reform on the grounds that Americans do not realize how deeply divided their country is on many issues. They believe that more representative government would reveal the depths of those divisions and make people even more disillusioned with their government. This conclusion seems to me short-sighted and too pessimistic, too close to the view that the people cannot be told the truth.

Do these problems have common threads or origins? Is there some useful general framework in which these countries and their problems can be placed that will enable us to see more clearly the problems and the possible solutions? Or is constitutional design so dependent on local historical, economic, and cultural conditions that no general theory for the perfection of democracy is possible.⁵ The availability of some genuinely useful general theory for the perfection of democracy would make democracy more attractive to nations that do not now enjoy it and would help insure the permanence of democracy in nations that have achieved elementary democracy.

The General Theory

The desired useful general framework may exist in the old theory of "mixed" government that teaches that the best government for a city or country is a government which combines the virtues of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. Under this theory, many problems of government, including all those we have mentioned above, result from an insufficiency or an overabundance of one or more of these three elements.

The idea of mixed government developed first in classical Greece. Perhaps the large number of small city states made easy and natural the classification and comparison of forms of government.⁶ As early as Aristotle (384-322 B.C.), the three fold classification of monarchies, aristocracies, and democracies and their degenerate forms — tyranny, oligarchy and mob rule — had been formulated along with the notion that some combination of forms

5. For an interesting summary of mankind's experience in democratic constitutions since the 18th century, see Robert A. Dahl, "Thinking About Democratic Constitutions: Conclusions from Democratic Experience," in *Political Order: Nomos XXXVIII*, ed. Ian Shapiro and Russell Hardin (New York: New York University, 1996) pp. 176-206. Dahl would seem to doubt the usefulness of a theory as general as the one I present here.

6. Plato (427-347 B.C.) in *The Republic* offered a five fold classification of governments with government by philosopher-kings as the best, followed by, in descending order, timocracy (rule by lovers of honor), oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny. See Plato, *The Republic*, Book VIII, translated by Alan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1968), pp. 221-249 (543a-569c).

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was better than any one of the pure forms alone. Aristotle argued in the *Politics* that the best government was a mixed government, one which combined the virtues of democracy and aristocracy and centered around a large middle-class.⁷

The Greek historian Polybius (200-118 B.C.) set out a natural cycle of political revolution, "the law of nature according to which constitutions change, are transformed, and finally revert to their original form."⁸ According to Polybius, states originated out of anarchy as monarchies which then degenerated into tyrannies, which were replaced by aristocracies which deteriorated into oligarchies, which were replaced by democracies which deteriorated into anarchy, from which again monarchies emerged. Impressed by the stability and longevity of the Roman Republic, Polybius attributed Rome's escape from the natural cycle of revolution to the fact that the three beneficial forms of government were combined in the Roman Constitution.

"...[I]f we were to fix our eyes only upon the power of the consuls, the constitution might give the impression of being completely monarchical and royal; if we confined our attention to the Senate it would seem to be aristocratic; and if we looked at the power of the people [to elect the holders of public office and to control the courts] it would appear to be a clear example of a democracy."⁹

Machiavelli (1469-1527 A.D.) adopted as his own Polybius's natural cycle of revolution and its cure in mixed government:

"I say, therefore, [after discussing all six forms of government] that all these kinds of government are harmful in consequence of the short life of

7. Aristotle, *Politics*, Book IV, Jowett translation (New York: Random House: Modern Library, 1943) pp. 168-208.

8. Polybius, *The Rise of the Roman Empire*, Book VI, "On The Forms of States," translated by Ian Scott-Kilvert (London: Penguin, 1979) p. 309.

9. Polybius, *The Rise of the Roman Empire*, Book VI, "On The Roman Constitution at Its Prime," translated by Ian Scott-Kilvert (London: Penguin, 1979) p. 312.

the three good ones and the viciousness of the three bad ones. Having noted these failings, prudent lawgivers rejected each of these forms individually and chose instead to combine them into one that would be firmer and more stable than any, since each form would serve as a check upon the others in a state having monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy at one and the same time."¹⁰

The development of the theory of mixed government culminated in the late eighteenth century in the United States Constitution and *The Federalist Papers*. The drafters of the Constitution were very much under the influence of the theory that the best government was a mixed government. The United States Constitution was consciously designed to incorporate the monarchical (the president) the aristocratic (the Senate and the judiciary) and the democratic (the House of Representatives).¹¹

10. Niccolo Machiavelli, *Discourses Upon the First Ten Books of Titus Livy*, Book One, translated by Daniel Donno, in *The Prince with Selections from The Discourses*, (New York: Bantam, 1981) p. 92.

11. "Jefferson [who was not in Philadelphia in 1787] contributed indirectly by shipping to Madison and Wythe from Paris sets of Polybius and other ancient publicists who discoursed on the theory of 'mixed government' on which the Constitution was based. The political literature of Greece and Rome was a positive and quickening influence on the Convention debates." Samuel Eliot Morrison, *The Oxford History of the American People, Vol. 1: Prehistory to 1789*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965) p. 395 in the Mentor Edition.

European and America political philosophy parted ways at the end of the eighteenth century. Europeans went on to Hegel and Marx and Nietzsche, to colonialism, fascism and communism. America remained in the eighteenth century. Americans are still governed by an eighteenth century constitution and the core political beliefs of Americans remain those of the European eighteenth century. Because of the current hard and soft power of American civilization, this tradition is being given new life. The rebirth of the tradition of natural rights, especially human rights, on a world-wide basis is part of the resurgence of the eighteenth century European political tradition of which the theory of mixed government is a major part. Europe itself is about to embark on a political experiment even more daring than that of the Americans in 1789. Reviving the theory of mixed government in its original European home might be of major assistance in handling problems such as "the democratic deficit."

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During most of the history of the development of the theory of mixed government, the various forms of government represented actual social classes. Mixed governments were found to be stable because no one social class dominated the others. A major change in the theory in its American incarnation was that the theory of mixed government became more and more a theory of the optimal structure of government independent of its reflection of social classes. In America, the idea was added that the only justification for the power of government was the consent of the governed population. This gave an increased importance to the democratic element as legitimating the entire constitutional structure.

In the general theory of mixed government offered here the forms of government are expressed as capabilities. The monarchical element provides the capability of quick decisive action. The aristocratic element provides wise and careful deliberation over how a country can achieve its goals. The democratic element ensures that the goals chosen are those of the many rather than the few, and confers legitimacy and authority on the government. The combination of forms prevents any of these capabilities from functioning without the others. Quick decisive action (the monarchical) is worse than useless unless there is good deliberation about the best means to achieve given ends (the aristocratic). Decisive action combined with good deliberation about means to ends is bad if the ends chosen benefit only a few (the absence of the democratic). If the ends are correct (the democratic), but the means are ill-chosen (lack of the aristocratic), or even if both the ends and the means are well-chosen, but there is little capacity for decisive action (lack of the monarchical), the result will be far from optimal. Good government requires a constitutional structure that features all three capabilities, the monarchical, the aristocratic, and the democratic, in proper balance.

The general theory offered here makes certain fundamental assumptions about human nature and the way things work in all human societies. This list is not exhaustive, but all interpretations and applications of the general theory share at least these assumptions.

The first is the mildly pessimistic assumption that people in power, individuals or elite groups, will, over time, unless checked, take advantage of their position and advance their own individual or elite group interests at the expense of the rest of the citizenry. In addition, their desire to maintain their privileged position will cloud their judgement of what policies and goals are best for the society as a whole. The second is the mildly optimistic assumption that people, both individuals and groups, are, over time, the best judge of their own self-interest.

These two assumptions support a third assumption that, over time, the citizenry as a whole will make better judgements about the larger goals of the society than any elite can make. These three assumptions explain the need for the democratic element in the general theory of mixed government. The general theory holds that the government must be the agent of the general citizenry, not its supervisor, and this will not happen unless the constitutional structure ensures that it happens. If elites could be trusted, over time, not to take personal advantage and also trusted to choose the larger goals of the society, then the monarchical and aristocratic elements would be sufficient for good government. The democratic would not be needed. A person believing this does not agree with the general theory of mixed government I offer here.

A major feature and advantage of my modern general theory of mixed government is that it does not rely on either the virtue of governors or the virtue of citizens as an essential component. The notion that the virtue of governors was the key to the proper functioning of government found major expression in Plato's *Republic*. Plato closely identified forms of government with the states of the souls of those governing.¹² This Platonic identification of the quality of government with the quality of those governing is inherently at odds with the notion of mixed government which distinguishes questions of what sort of governmental structures are best from the question of what sort

12. Plato, *The Republic*, Book VIII, translated by Alan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1968), pp. 221-249 (543a-569c).

of governors are best. This distinction is what allowed Western political thought after Plato to separate out questions of constitutional structure and study them independently of evaluations of the virtue or character of those who govern. In the last parts of *The Republic* and in *The Statesman* and *The Laws*, Plato conceded the need for the rule of law in a world where men of sufficient caliber to govern by virtue alone are not available or, if available, cannot be expected to gain or to retain power, but it was Aristotle who made the move to mixed government.

The extensive development of the theory and practice of mixed government was unique to Classical and then Western European civilization. Chinese political thought went through the two Platonic stages of relying on the virtue of rulers and then recognizing the need to add the rule of law, but there was no theorist analogous to Aristotle in the Chinese tradition to work out a theory of forms of government and then add the idea of mixing the forms to produce the best result. In the absence of such a theory, the Chinese and the Japanese have been handicapped by a reliance on the virtuous ruler or elite as a necessary condition of good government.¹³

Although there was much talk of republican civic virtue in the tradition that produced the United States Constitution, the modern general theory of mixed government makes the realistic assumption that people will be no better than average. Americans expect their governors, and their fellow citizens, to be a mixed combination of intelligent and honorable men and women, knaves, and fools. Good government does not depend on the presence of the extraordinary person or class of persons. Americans typically do not completely trust their governors as individuals, either their honesty or their judgement, but most Americans do trust the elaborate system of checks and

13. "Virtue" is a difficult term that has shifted meaning over the centuries and is different in the Classical, the Western European, and the Chinese traditions. See Lee Yearley, *Mencius and Aquinas: Theories of Virtue and Conceptions of Courage* (New York: SUNY Press, 1990), a fine example of cross-cultural comparison on a difficult subject.

balances that make up the structure of the American Constitution.

Despite the fact that many Americans in the last seventy years have viewed the president as a father figure (FDR) or as a young prince (JFK), the deeper American tradition does not trust in the virtue of presidents. This explains in part the patience of Americans with President Clinton's lack of personal virtue. Americans trust the Constitution. They have generally never trusted the men who hold constitutional office. The structure of the Constitution itself, with its elaborate balances and checks against concentrated power, expresses this lack of trust in the virtue of those who govern.

In contrast, most Japanese are not adherents of the theory of mixed government. They do not regard the government as their agent but as their supervisor. Believers in mixed government accept the existence of some knaves and fools in government, and depend on constitutional structure to keep them in check. But in Japan, when the University of Tokyo graduates at the Ministry of Finance turn out to be knaves or fools, cynicism sets in. Many Japanese long for an end to "politics" which they see as government by people lacking virtue. They keep hoping for a better class of ruler. Many Japanese do not understand the assumptions underlying their own Constitution. This is not surprising since the Japanese did not write their Constitution.¹⁴

Application of the General Theory

To illustrate the usefulness of the old theory of mixed government in assessing the problems of modern democracy and suggesting solutions, I will use its terms to describe two pressing problems in the perfection of modern democracy and present two practical solutions in the form of particular applications of one interpretation of the general theory of mixed government.

14. See Kyoko Inoue, *MacArthur's Japanese Constitution: A Linguistic and Cultural Study of its Making* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1991) for a detailed account of the creation of the present Japanese Constitution.

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The first problem is the weakness of the democratic element caused by the enormous size of modern electorates. I shall examine this problem mainly in the American context because, as the second largest democracy in the world (only India is larger), America suffers more than most democracies from this problem. To solve the problem in America, I propose a statute restoring the ratio of members of the House of Representatives to citizens to something closer to what it was in 1787. This requires enlarging the House of Representatives by a factor of twenty to 8700 members, a change that does not require a constitutional amendment.

The second problem is the weakness of the monarchical function in large democracies. I take the chronic inability of the Japanese government to make hard policy choices as my example. Despite the use of the word "monarchical" in the general theory, the application I propose does not involve any enlargement in the role of the Japanese emperor. Instead I propose a constitutional amendment providing for a prime minister directly elected by the people. I do not propose a separate executive branch as in the United States, but rather a modest modification of the Japanese parliamentary system to strengthen the office of prime minister and thus the monarchical capability.

It is the mark of a good general theory that all sides in a dispute on which reasonable minds can differ can use the theory's vocabulary as a general framework within which to argue. A good general theory should not by itself decide hard cases or dictate exactly how it should be applied. Thus a good general theory for the perfection or fine-tuning of democracy should allow people sharing allegiance to the general theory to differ over how it should be applied.

The reader should keep in mind that the ability of the theory of mixed government to provide a useful perspective on the problems of modern democracy is independent of the soundness and usefulness of the two particular proposals I advance below. Opponents of my particular proposals should be able to use the terms of general theory to argue against my proposals.

Problem I: The Democratic Function in Electorates of Enormous Size: The Case of the United States

The problem of how to incorporate the democratic element into the actual constitutional structure in a proper balance with the aristocratic and monarchical elements was an major issue at the convention that drafted the Constitution in 1787 and in the ratification debates that followed. Much of the concern focused on the size of the House of Representatives. In 1787, the total population of the United States was less than four million.¹⁵ Approximately twenty percent of the population were black slaves.¹⁶ Of the remaining eighty percent, half were women, none of whom were allowed to vote, and about thirty percent were under voting age.¹⁷ Thus the total possible voting population was less than 1.2 million citizens. How large did the Framers think the House should be? Too small a House would be undemocratic in that it could constitute a cabal against the liberties of the people and would itself be aristocratic. Too large a House would destroy its effectiveness as a deliberative body.

The constitutional convention of 1787 decided on a House of sixty-five members until a census could be taken in 1790.¹⁸ A total population of thirty thousand (including women and children, with slaves counting for three-fifths of a person) was set as the minimum size of a congressional district.¹⁹

15. *The World Almanac*, 1999 (Mahway, N.J.: Premedia Reference, Inc., 1998) p. 376.

16. *The World Almanac*, 1999 (Mahway, N.J.: Premedia Reference, Inc., 1998) p. 378.

17. I have used throughout this essay an estimate of thirty percent of the population as being too young to vote.

18. US Const, Art I, § 2.

19. US Const, Art I, § 2.

In 1790, Congress passed by a two-thirds vote twelve Articles of Amendment to the new Constitution. Articles Three through Twelve were ratified by the States and became the Bill of Rights. Of the remaining two, one was ratified as the 27th Amendment in 1993. The only one of the twelve not to be ratified by the States and become part of the Constitution reads as follows:

Madison was eloquent in his defense of these numbers in *The Federalist Papers* when arguing for ratification of the proposed Constitution.

“Sixty or seventy men may be more properly trusted with a given degree of power than six or seven. But it does not follow that six or seven hundred would be proportionably a better depository. And if we carry on the supposition to six or seven thousand, the whole reasoning ought to be reversed. The truth is that in all cases a certain number at least seems to be necessary to secure the benefits of free consultation and discussion, and to guard against too easy a combination for improper purposes; as, on the other hand, the number ought at most to be kept within a certain limit, in order to avoid the confusion and intemperance of a multitude. In all very numerous assemblies, of whatever characters composed, passion never fails to wrest the scepter from reason. Had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates, every Athenian Assembly would still have been a mob.”²⁰

In addition to mob rule, too large a House runs the danger of being control-

Article. I. After the first enumeration required by the first article of the Constitution, there shall be one representative for every thirty thousand, until the number shall amount to one hundred, after which the proportion shall be so regulated by Congress, that there shall not be less than one representative for every forty thousand persons, until the number of representatives shall amount to two hundred, after which the proportion shall be so regulated by Congress, that there shall not be less than two hundred representatives, nor more than one representative for every fifty thousand. From *The Founders' Constitution, Volume 5*, ed. Kurland and Lerner (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1987) p. 40.

It seems clear that at least two-thirds of Congress was willing to support districts of more than fifty thousand. In 1790, the female half of the population was not eligible to vote, and twenty percent of the population were black slaves (but counted only three-fifths of a person in determining the population of a congressional district). Thus only thirty to forty percent of the population of a district was eligible to vote as opposed to about seventy percent now (thirty percent being underage). Under modern conditions of universal suffrage, districts of thirty thousand would contain more voters than districts of fifty thousand in 1790.

20. James Madison, Federalist No. 55 in *The Federalist Papers*, ed. by Clinton Rossiter (New York: Mentor paperback, Penguin, USA, 1961) p. 342.

led by a small group of insiders.

The people can never err more than in supposing that by multiplying their representatives beyond a certain limit they strengthen the barrier against the government of a few. Experience will forever admonish them that, on the contrary, *after securing sufficient number for the purposes of safety, of local information, and of diffusive sympathy with the whole society* [italics in original], they will counteract their own views by every addition to their representatives. The countenance of the government may become more democratic, but the soul that animates it will be more oligarchic. The machine will be enlarged, but the fewer, and often the more secret, will be the springs by which its motions are directed.²¹

As slavery was abolished and women received the vote and tens of millions of immigrants poured into the United States, the House continued to expand. The House reached its current membership of 435 after the 1910 census. The 1910 census recorded a population of ninety-two million. In 1929, Congress passed a statute permanently fixing the size of the House at 435 members. House districts continued to expand in size. The current population of the United States is about 270 million. Congressional districts now have populations of more than six hundred thousand people, with more than four hundred thousand potential voters per district.²²

At this ratio of voters to representatives, four representatives would have been sufficient to represent the entire United States voting population of 1790. If the current British House of Commons had this ratio of members

21. James Madison, Federalist No. 58 in *The Federalist Papers*, ed. by Clinton Rossiter, (New York: Mentor paperback, Penguin, USA, 1961) pp. 360-361. Madison does look a bit into the future in No. 58, but it seems safe to say that if he had foreseen districts of six hundred thousand citizens, the current size, he would have doubted that the House could provide "diffusive sympathy with the whole society."

22. See Barone and Ujifusa, *The Almanac of American Politics, 1998* (Washington, D.C.: National Journal, 1997) for the population and numbers of voters in each congressional district.

to constituents, there would be only 110 MPs. If the House of Representatives had the same ratio of representatives to constituents as does the current House of Commons, the House of Representatives would have 2,500 members.

We are faced with a dilemma not foreseen by Madison. Shall we enlarge that part of the government embodying the democratic function into a body of thousands risking the control of the few and the passions of the mob, or keep that part small and render it aristocratic in nature? Americans have chosen the second horn of this dilemma. The House has now become an aristocratic body. House members are part of the national aristocracy. The House of Representatives functions as a near duplicate of the Senate.

From the point of view of the theory of mixed government that animated the Framers, the House can no longer perform its intended democratic function. House members of course do what they think is best for the country, as do senators, as do all well-intentioned aristocrats, but it is impossible for one person to represent six hundred thousand citizens in the way envisaged by the Framers.

In the absence of a democratic House, the democratic function is now performed by an ad hoc mixture of public opinion polls, media, and lobbies of various sorts.²³ This was nicely illustrated in the recent impeachment of President Clinton by the House. Whatever one thinks of the merits of the impeachment, it was odd that the House voted to impeach even though impeachment was favored by at most thirty percent of the population. The voice of the people was in fact represented not by the House but by the pub-

23. See James S. Fishkin, *The Voice of the People: Public Opinion and Democracy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), Chapter 3, for an excellent account of the rise of "public opinion" in American democracy. Fishkin's experiments with "deliberative polls" are an attempt to combine mass democracy and deliberation. I see my suggestion of a very large House as a more practical solution to the same problem. The deliberation would take place between a representative and his constituents rather than among representatives.

lic opinion polls. People defended the actions of the House members in terms appropriate for senators, that is, as wise aristocrats who, if necessary, should act as a check on public opinion. It was left to public opinion polls to provide, in Madison's words, "diffusive sympathy with the whole society."

The Framers were not populists. In the Constitution of 1787, only the House was elected by the people. The Senate was elected by the legislatures of the states and the president by the Electoral College. Yet even the Framers gave the sole power of impeachment to the House. Their idea was that the process of removing the president should not even begin unless the people demand it.

The same sort of formal representation that was missing in the impeachment of President Clinton is also missing in day-to-day congressional legislation. We now have two chambers of aristocrats, senior aristocrats (the Senate) and junior aristocrats (the House). No major part of government supplies the democratic element that the Framers intended to balance the more elite branches of the Senate and the judiciary. No branch of government ensures that the goals of government are in fact those of the general population.

How can the democratic capability be built back into the constitutional structure so that the people are again represented in the normal processes of government rather than having to depend on the media, lobbyists, and public opinion polls?

I propose the following federal statute to help strengthen the democratic element in the American national government.

Congressional districts shall contain a population of at least 31,000, but not more than 35,000. Where possible, district boundaries shall follow town, city, or county lines, and shall be regular in shape when not following a pre-existing boundary.

Congresspersons shall receive a salary of twice the median house-

hold income of all Americans plus an additional amount of the median household income for expenses. The House shall in addition provide a secure computer connection between the congressperson's home or office in his district and the Capital so that he may vote in committee or on the floor of the House from his home district.

A House of 8700 would not be more expensive. The current House employs about eleven thousand staff members, over seven thousand of whom are the staff of individual members.²⁴ The rest are committee staff, leadership staff and other staff necessary to run the House. My plan would pay each member a salary of twice the annual US household income (about \$80,000) plus another \$40,000 for expenses, but no staff would be provided. The members of the new House would be more like full-time voters than legislators.

My proposal would reduce the size of congressional districts by a factor of twenty, from six-hundred thousand to just over thirty thousand, the minimum size permitted by Article One of the Constitution. This would produce a House of 8700 members. People actually voting in each congressional district would number from five to twelve thousand (the current numbers divided by twenty). A state such as Massachusetts, instead of ten representatives, would have two hundred. This proposal does not require amending the Constitution.

Leading citizens in a single town or urban neighborhood would be the normal candidates for House membership. Personal reputation for knowledge of the international and national issues with which the House concerns itself, and the trust of one's neighbors, would be sufficient for election. Money and a media image would not be necessary. It now costs more than one million

24. Ornstein, Mann, and Malbin, *Vital Statistics on Congress, 1993-94* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1994). Cited in *The American Almanac, 1996-97* (Austin, Texas: Hoover's Inc., 1996) Table No. 445, p. 280. *The American Almanac, 1996-97*, is a privately printed edition of the *1996 Statistical Abstract of the United States* published by the Bureau of the Census.

dollars to run for the House against an incumbent.²⁵ Such an entry level threshold ensures that only the rich, or those who can enlist the rich in their support, can run against an incumbent with a chance of winning. My proposal would solve the problems of campaign financing for one branch of the Congress. Because of the small size of the districts in an 8,700 member House, problems of proportional representation of ethnic and racial minorities would also be largely solved.

The proposal is the opposite of a populist one such as Ross Perot's national town meeting. Indeed it is an attempt to answer the need he expresses for more democracy in the national government with a preemptive strike rooted in representative government. The problem with most populist proposals is that they do not recognize the need for aristocratic or monarchical elements in good government. National elites must be free to make quick decisions and design good policies to effect goals approved by the people. Contrary to Perot, most citizens are not capable of voting on the complex issues with which a national legislature must be concerned. (That is the main problem with excessive reliance on public opinion polls.) But they are capable of electing just one of their number to vote for them in a national legislature.

An important innovation would be the extensive use of the Internet. Representatives would be free to stay in their districts and vote in committee or on the floor by computer. The rest of the nation and the world would be free to listen in.

Lobbyists for "special interests" are currently an important part of the education of House members on issues before the House. This educative function would be greatly enhanced as lobbyists' information and arguments circulate to tens of thousands over the Internet. No one person would have to sort through and organize the material. Good ideas would be repeated

25. See Barone and Ujifusa, *The Almanac of American Politics, 1998* (Washington, D.C.: National Journal, 1997) for the amounts of money spent by each candidate in each congressional district.

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and become central to the discussion of any given issue. Although discussion and deliberation among the House members themselves would be greatly reduced, the quality of deliberation in the society would be higher, as would the number of participants.²⁶

A House of 8,700 would not be a deliberative body. It would be a mini-electorate of informed attentive citizens who are chosen by their neighbors to vote in the mini-referendums required for any piece of legislation to become law. The House would be a ratifying legitimizing body representing informed public opinion instead of an aristocratic deliberative body duplicating the functions of the Senate.

* * *

How about Madison's two major objections to a much larger house? Will a larger House lead to mob rule? Will such a House lead to control by a small group of insiders? How might things might actually run in a House of 8700 members?

First, Madison's fears were of a face-to-face assembly. Our representatives would be communicating with each other largely by computer. Many of the representatives would seldom leave their districts. Their face-to-face relations would be primarily with their constituents. They would be more likely to be swept up in the passions of their neighbors than in the passions of the House as a whole. But no matter how passionate they might be individually, each representative would cast only one vote in 8700. The passions that unite them with their constituents would be canceled out in the

26. A primitive version of what might occur can be found at the Virtual Congress at www.policy.com. If the participants were actual House members and the votes were for real, both the quality and number of participants in the actual debates and subsidiary discussion groups would be much greater. See James S. Fishkin, *The Voice of the People: Public Opinion and Democracy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), Chapter 3, for an account of his experiments with "deliberative polls." My proposal takes his experiments a step further by making (at least one of) the citizens taking part in the "deliberative poll" actual members of the House.

voting in a large House. Madison's argument in Federalist No. 10 that a large republic will be less subject to faction than a small one is directly on point.²⁷ Unless a large part of the entire country was swept by a single passion, the new House would generally be slower to action than the present House. It would be harder to stampede a large House than it is to stampede the current House which is gathered in one physical place. And if, as the Framers anticipated, such a stampede occasionally occurred, then the Senate, the president, or the courts would head it off.

Rather than an excess of passion, the danger of a large House may be that it would be too stable, too much in the middle of the road, too representative of majority opinion. Polls consistently show that Americans are less exercised about abortion, or gun control, the environment, foreign affairs, or any hot political topic than those in Washington. Twenty members dividing a constituency of six hundred thousand are much more likely collectively to have a predictable voting pattern and be closer to the center of the political spectrum than one member representing the entire six hundred thousand. Extreme opinions would cancel each other out.

A large House would combine the virtues of proportional representation of minorities who lived together with the stability of a first past the post system in individual districts. Fringe groups whose members were spread across the country would have less influence than they do now. At present, with only one representative per four hundred thousand voters, fringe groups can make the important marginal difference in close elections with strategic distribution of campaign funds. Currently, a congressman must, unless he is independently wealthy, be beholden to several small interest groups pushing concerns that the vast majority of his constituents do not share. With districts of only twenty thousand voters and little money needed to campaign, candidates are more likely to be leading citizens in the communities that elect them. They are likely to be in the mainstream in their districts. Even in

27. James Madison, Federalist No. 10 in *The Federalist Papers*, ed. by Clinton Rossiter, (New York: Mentor paperback, Penguin, USA, 1961), pp. 85-86.

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rural Montana, or in the inner city of New York, there are few or no geographical areas of thirty thousand people with a majority of extremists. And if a few manage to get elected, they would be only a few in 8,700. Madison's fears of mob rule are unlikely to materialize. A large House is more likely to be too slow to action than too quick.

* * *

How about control by the few within a much larger House? Here I think Madison's objection is still sound. An elite would run the larger House. The speaker of the House and the leadership chosen by the speaker would choose to reside full-time in Washington, D.C. That leadership would be an elite group. Some representatives would be more powerful than others. Yet the internal politics of the House itself would be more democratic than at present. The choice of a speaker would be an open election involving 8,700 members, too large a number to be easily manipulated by a small group.

The speaker elected by a large House would, by virtue of that election, have some of the political authority that now attaches to the president. A large House would have more political authority than the current House. It would recover for the federal government some of the authority now possessed by the media and the public opinion polls. Districts might compete to elect members who could themselves be elected by other members to leadership positions. Many more people could and would run and serve, yet there would not be the emasculation of the effectiveness of the legislature that term limits might involve. My proposal would allow the continuation of an experienced elite at the top. Madison is right that a small group would manage the House, but that small group would be under democratic control by the rest of the House.

Although the election of the speaker by an 8,700 member House would confer serious political authority on the person elected, it seems unlikely that the speaker would have anything like the power of the prime minister in the British House of Commons. First, the House would be checked by the Senate and the other branches of government. There would be party organiza-

tion of the House, but because people could be elected with little money and without the help of a party, it could not be as tightly organized as even the present House, much less as tightly organized as the House of Commons. The power of the speaker and the committee chairmen would consist mainly in deciding what comes to a vote. Most votes in an expanded House of Representatives would be similar to free votes in the British House of Commons.

It would be harder for committee chairmen or congressional leadership to predict in close cases how a final vote would come out. Control of votes by a single person or small group would be much more difficult. This lack of control seems chaotic only in the sense that a market economy seems chaotic to people accustomed to a planned economy. The old planners especially get vertigo, but the economic and political decisions made by a decentralized process are usually better over the long run.

After some attempts to run business as the old House did, the new House would probably do much less drafting of legislation. The Senate would become more important as a drafting body, but they would draft "in the shadow" of the House because they and the administration would want to propose things that could pass the House. A bill passed by the House would have much of the authority that a referendum in a large state does now. Bills would be shorter and less complex. There would be fewer of them. Congress would not try to micromanage by legislation as much as it does now. More administrative power would remain with the Executive Branch.

Would political parties be weakened? I think they would within the House itself. But the very size of the House would encourage more organization of House members by both political parties and other interest groups.

When the new enlarged House is elected, with twenty representatives substituted for every current representative, the first thing that would happen is that representatives would organize in state and regional associations that would be further divided by party, so there would be a Democratic Mass-

achusetts Congresspersons Association and a Republican one as well. States where the entire congressional representation was from one party would be much less common. Even a state as liberal as Massachusetts has pockets of conservatives. Conservative states have pockets of liberals. A major advantage of the change would be that a state's representatives would reflect more accurately the variety of opinion within a state.

Regional associations of representatives would also arise to represent regional interests. These associations would cut across party lines. In addition to associations based on party and region, there would be formal and informal organizations of groups of representatives based on issues: labor relations, welfare policy, defense policy, the environment, etc.. These groups would also cut across party lines. Journalists, academics, people who are now congressional staffers, and people who join the executive branch to try and influence policy would instead become congresspersons for one or a few terms. There would be more turnover in the House, and a greater variety of people serving in the House, many of them genuine experts in the fields in which the House was legislating. Many more people would be involved in politics at every level. Many more people would know a member of Congress personally. A major benefit of the proposal would be the reentry into politics of more of the general public.

* * *

How about the question of constituent service? On those occasions when a citizen goes directly to his congressperson for help with dealing with the government, would someone who is only one of 8700 be able to help as much as someone who is only one of 435? Perhaps not, but there would be a major gain in the access of the average citizen to his or her congressperson. As a practical matter, a representative with six hundred thousand constituents is able to help only a small percentage. Large contributors tend to get the most help. A representative with only thirty thousand constituents, a large proportion of whom know the representative personally, and all of whom are the representative's neighbors, would be more accessible to the average person and would care more for each voter. There would be twen-

ty times the number of congresspersons to help the average citizen.

* * *

I have fixed on the number of 8,700 as the desirable number of House members, twenty times the current number of representatives, because no constitutional amendment is required to make this change. This means districts of thirty thousand people with twenty-one thousand voters and five to thirteen thousand people actually voting. (These numbers of those actually voting would, one hopes, go up.) My proposal substitutes a mini-electorate of attentive informed educated citizens for the current deliberative body. Once this change is accepted, there are few limits on the actual size of the House. Imagine an American House of Representatives one hundred times larger, or one thousand times larger, or ten thousand times larger. This would produce districts of six thousand, or six hundred, or sixty constituents. The problems are not so much in the size of the House itself. We have given up the idea that the House would be a deliberative body with members talking to each other in favor of the House as a mini-electorate whose members deliberate primarily with their own constituents. The key is the size of constituencies. What size would produce maximum deliberation among constituents, and maximum quality in the representatives?

In my view, sixty constituents per district (a House of 4.3 million) would be too small. There would certainly be no problems of proportional representation or campaign financing, but the pool from which representatives is drawn would be too small, and elections would be too personal. District lines would be very difficult to maintain and elections hard to administer. People would often be elected for reasons other than their ability to understand and to vote on matters of national importance.

A district with a population of six hundred, with about four hundred and fifty eligible to vote, and perhaps half that number actually voting (the percentages of those voting would likely increase), has the appeal that it is about the size of a New England town meeting. The House itself would then have 435,000 members. Open face-to-face discussions between citizens and their

representatives would be a common occurrence. Everyone who wished to could know their representative personally. The entire constituency would be smaller than most Internet use groups. A House member could easily educate his constituency on complicated matters. Remember that citizens in such a system are using the direct democracy of a town meeting not to decide national questions but to discuss them, and to elect one of their number to vote in the mini-electorate of a 435,000 member House. General educational standards are now so much higher than in 1790 that I think that virtually any district of six hundred people anywhere in the United States would have residents willing to serve that are of the quality now serving in the House.

Districts with a population of six thousand, with about four thousand people eligible to vote, might result in candidates and members of better quality than those now serving. Currently, the high entry costs of more than one million dollars to run for a House seat rule out all but the rich or those with the backing of the rich. Many well-educated citizens of sound judgement who now serve on local school boards but whose actual expertise and interest is more in national matters would run and be elected. The House would be only forty-three thousand in number and so membership would be an honor attained by less than one percent of American citizens.

The ideal then is probably districts of about six thousand constituents with a House numbering about forty-three thousand. Such a change would require a constitutional amendment. To make my proposal politically feasible, I propose only a statutory change to the 8,700 member House allowed under the present Constitution. If that works as well I think it might, then a constitutional amendment providing for a much larger House would become possible.

* * *

Another interesting consequence of a House of 8,700 would be in the election of the president by the Electoral College. Population will count for a bit more than at present, although not as much as one might intuitively expect.

Bigger states such as Massachusetts will gain influence 202/8800 (2.29545% of the total electoral college vote) instead of 12/538 (2.233048%). California will go from 54/538 (10.03717%) to 1042/8800 (11.8409%), Vermont from 3/538 (.55762%) down to 22/8800 (.25%). The average state has eight representatives now and would have 160 representatives in the new House. Under the Constitution, states can choose how to apportion their electoral votes. They would, I think, be more likely to distribute them by districts so that all of a state's electoral votes might not go to the same candidate.

Problem II: An Underdeveloped Monarchical Function: The Case of Japan

Japan suffers from a lack of the democratic element in the same way as the United States. The goals of the government cannot be kept in line with the goals of the public. During the first forty-five years of the post-World II period this was not apparent because both the people and the government pursued the same major aim of economic growth. The existing power structure was able to deliver on this goal. In the last few years, as Japan's economy has matured, competing goals have emerged. Some want continued rapid economic growth, some want a Japan more assertive in international matters, and some want to maintain the present distribution of social and economic power. The weakness of the democratic element has made it difficult for the Japanese to choose between these often conflicting goals.

The weakness of the democratic element has been exacerbated by an even weaker monarchical element. Unlike the United States or the United Kingdom, Japan lacks the ability to commit the nation to war or peace or to make major changes in policy quickly and decisively.

In the years following the World War II, the domestic policy goal of Japan was economic growth at all cost. In foreign policy, Japan followed the lead of the United States. The weakness of the monarchical function in Japan was not obvious. Since the end of the Cold War, it has become glaringly apparent, most dramatically in the Gulf War, when Japan fumbled about, finally contributing thirteen billion dollars and receiving little credit because it was

so tardy in making its decision. Japan might have quickly announced that while it would contribute nothing to the war effort, it would spend thirteen billion dollars on humanitarian efforts to rebuild after the war. Such a firm rapid decision would have increased Japan's prestige even in the United States, but especially in Asia. Alternatively, if Japan, like Australia, had quickly supported the war, Japan would have received much more credit for a much smaller contribution. Japan lacked the capability to make either decision.²⁸

Another consequence of a weak monarchical function is the inability of Japan to make the decisions necessary to end its current long recession or to intervene decisively in the economic crisis in Asia. The enormous amounts of money being committed to prop up banks and weak companies inside of Japan may be largely wasted. The Japanese know what to do, but the weakness of the monarchical element in the structure of the Japanese government renders them incapable of effective action.²⁹

Finally, Japan is ill-equipped to participate in the great power game developing in Asia with China, the United States, and Japan as the major players. The problem is not with the professional diplomats in the Japanese Foreign Ministry. They are competent enough. The problem is the absence of political leadership. The government lacks the capability to secure a mandate for sound foreign policy from the citizenry and then put that policy into

28. Ichiro Ozawa in *Blueprint For a New Japan* (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1994) describes in detail the poor performance of Japan during the Gulf War which he attributes to Japan's inability to act quickly and decisively.

29. There is wide-spread recognition in Japan that part of the problem is systemic. In 1994, the Japanese put in a new election system that corrected part of the problem. For an excellent account of the pre-reform system, see J.A.A. Stockwin, "Political Parties and Political Opposition," in *Democracy in Japan*, ed. Ishida and Krauss (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 1989). For an excellent account of why the change did not achieve all that it was hoped that it would, see Richard Katz, *Japan: The System That Soured* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1998) pp. 318-331. Katz's book has an excellent bibliography and is the best recent account in English of the failure of the Japanese political system to cope with Japan's economy.

effect. Concerned Japanese wish for strong and effective leaders. Most blame the quality of people at the top and wish for great men, but it is not the quality of the politicians that is at fault. The Japanese tradition of decision making by consensus, and Japanese styles of leadership, ensures that the same parliamentary system that produces strong prime ministers in Britain produces weak prime ministers in Japan. Since the Japanese are unlikely to change their cultural traditions, and the quality of people at the top is unlikely to change, the solution may be to adjust slightly the parliamentary system so that the prime minister of Japan is, by virtue of the constitutional structure, the most powerful politician in Japan.

In the British system, it is the office of prime minister that is powerful, not the individual who occupies that office. The British prime minister has the authority to make key decisions because of the power and authority of the office. When Margaret Thatcher or John Major lost the office of prime minister, they automatically lost their ability to influence key decisions.

In Japan, it is individuals who are powerful rather than the office of prime minister. It is not uncommon for a man to be more powerful after he ceases to be prime minister than he was while he was prime minister. Yasuhiro Nakasone may have more actual ability to determine events now than he did more than a decade ago when he was prime minister and other more powerful men worked behind the scenes. "Shadow shoguns" in Japan dilute the authority and capability of the actual prime minister to make the quick and effective decisions necessary for governing any large modern democracy. Power is so diffused among powerful politicians and bureaucrats that difficult decisions cannot be made. When powerful men disagree, there is no commonly accepted procedure for forcing a decision to be made. No one has the authority to speak and act for Japan.

The Japanese have a parliamentary system much like the British. Because they have no tradition of powerful offices, the system cannot function to ensure a sufficient monarchical element in government. Fortunately, the Japanese have a Constitution that can be amended. Unfortunately, the

Japanese have never amended a constitution (although the present Constitution was technically an amendment of the Meiji Constitution). In the post-war years, the conflict over Article Nine (the article of the Constitution of Japan that renounces war as a sovereign right of the nation) has polarized the argument over the desirability of amending the Constitution at all. The Japanese need the experience of amending their Constitution to make clear to ordinary Japanese the importance of constitutional structures and the possibility of a common decision to alter those structures. My proposal amends the Japanese Constitution as follows:

First Article of Amendment

The prime minister shall be directly elected by the people in a separate and simultaneous election whenever there is a general election of the House of Representatives. Each electoral district used in the election of members of House of Representatives (currently 300) shall have one district vote which shall be cast for the candidate for prime minister receiving the largest number of votes by citizens in that district. The emperor shall appoint as prime minister the candidate receiving the largest number of district votes. In case of a tie vote, the prime minister shall be selected by the newly elected Diet in accord with Article 67.

All candidates for prime minister must be nominated by a petition signed by at least fifty members of the current or just dissolved House of Representatives and must be themselves be members of the current or just dissolved House of Representatives. A person elected prime minister shall, by virtue of that election, be a member of the House of Representatives. A person may, but need not, run simultaneously for prime minister and for a seat representing a district in the House of Representatives.

Whenever there is vacancy in the post of prime minister, whether by individual resignation or death, or whenever the House passes a non-confidence resolution, or rejects a confidence resolution, the

prime minister shall resign, the House of Representatives shall be dissolved, and a new House shall be elected in accord with Article 54 and, simultaneously, a new prime minister shall be elected in accord with this Article of Amendment. A prime minister may run to succeed himself or herself as prime minister. No person shall serve more than a total of nine years as prime minister in his or her lifetime.

The purpose of this amendment is to strengthen the office of prime minister within a parliamentary system, not to set up an independent executive branch as in the United States. The executive power under the current Japanese Constitution is vested in the Cabinet (Article 65) which consists of the prime minister and the other ministers of state (Article 66) who are appointed by the prime minister and may be removed by him as he chooses (Article 68). None of this would change.

Under the proposed amendment, the prime minister would be elected using the same districts as the House. Japan now elects three hundred members of the Diet in single member districts using a first past the post system. In addition to voting for a candidate for district representative, Japanese citizens cast a second vote for a party. Two hundred more representatives are elected from party lists on a proportional representation system. My proposal would add a third vote for prime minister. In the single member districts now used for three hundred of the five hundred members of the House, the winner of the vote for representative in that district would normally be of the same party or coalition of parties as the winner of that district's vote for prime minister. Thus, normally, a prime minister would belong to the party or coalition of parties with the largest representation in the lower House. In the unusual case when the newly elected prime minister did not enjoy the support of a majority of the newly elected House, either the House or the prime minister could force a new election immediately — the House could vote no-confidence, or the prime minister could resign.

The requirements that all candidates for prime minister be themselves

members of the current or just dissolved House, and that they be nominated by at least fifty members of the current or just dissolved House, are designed to prevent outside celebrities, even popular prefectural governors or members of the House of Councilors (the upper house under the Japanese Constitution), from being elected prime minister without first becoming a member of the lower House and enjoying the support of a substantial number of lower House members. The intent is to make the Japanese system function more like the British system, not move to an American presidential system.

The Amendment would prevent a change in prime ministers without a general election of the lower House. This would have prevented the situation which occurred from 1993 to 1996 when Japan had three changes of prime ministers (Morihiro Hosokawa to Tsutomu Hata: Hata to Tomiichi Murayama: Murayama to Ryutaro Hashimoto) without an intervening election. The resignation in 1998 of Ryutaro Hashimoto would by itself have forced a new election of the entire House and a direct election of the new prime minister

The purpose of the proposed amendment is to make the holder of the office of prime minister the most powerful politician in Japan and a focus of national decision making, thus increasing the monarchical function of government and the ability of the government to act rapidly and decisively.

A directly elected prime minister would also increase the democratic element in Japan. The prime minister would be chosen by the people and could not be removed against his will so long as he could muster a majority of votes in the House. If he did resign voluntarily or was removed by a vote of no confidence, both he and all of the House would have to go back to the voters for a fresh mandate in a new election. The new amendment would strengthen the political independence and authority of the prime minister, yet keep him or her firmly under democratic control.

* * *

The useful application of the theory of mixed government to any given

country requires detailed knowledge of that country's political and social history. I have focussed on the countries I know best. I am not competent to apply the theory in detail to other political systems, but I hope that it will be useful for others. Here are some suggestions for application of the theory.

The British are rethinking the role of the House of Lords. Will it be elected or appointed? Crucial to that decision will be consideration of which of the three elements — monarchical, aristocratic, or democratic — is in need of strengthening. Will the new House of Lords be assigned some of the aristocratic job of policy formation now done by the British civil service? Will it have executive powers? Will it continue its judicial functions? Might it function as a check on the power of a prime minister with a large majority in the House of Commons?

The only three political units larger than the United States are the European Union, India, and China. The theory of mixed government seems to call for a powerful monarchical office for large democracies. What is crucial is that it be the office itself that is powerful, not the person holding the office. In order to be sufficiently powerful, that office will need to derive its authority from election, preferably direct election, by the people. It is, for example, hard to imagine how the European Union will develop a strong and unified foreign policy without such an office. Similarly, China and India need such an office to hold together as single nations. Some one person must have the legitimate authority to make swift, effective decisions on behalf of the nation. That person's authority cannot be personal as personal power is too likely to be contested when difficult decisions need to be made, producing paralysis.

China, India, and the European Union also seem to need strengthening of the democratic function. My interpretation and application of the theory of mixed government in the American context suggested that districts of six thousand citizens would be optimal. In America (total population of 270 million), this would yield a House of about forty-three thousand members. In the European Union (total population of 300 million), the lower house would

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number about fifty thousand. In India (population of one billion), the lower house would be about 160,000. In China (population of 1.3 billion) the lower house would be about 200,000. If my application of the theory is a good idea for the United States, it is likely a good idea for these larger entities.