

The Historical Background to Spinoza's Definition of *Causa Sui*¹⁾

Katunori MATUDA

(Received on October 30, 2008)

I

Part One of Spinoza's *Ethics* does not have any preface. This fact has been somewhat perplexing to Spinoza scholars because each of the other four parts has an informative preface. It is well known that Part One, hence the whole edifice, of the *Ethics* begins abruptly with the definition of the notion of *Causa Sui*.

Definitions

I By cause of itself I understand that whose essence involves existence, *or* that whose nature cannot be conceived except as existing. (Curley, p. 408)²⁾

This definition is *prima facie* strange, because it seems unnecessary to define the notion of *Causa Sui*. It is quite clear, at least for the philosophically-minded readers of Spinoza's time, that the notion means an efficient cause of itself (*causa efficiens sui ipsius*) or more lengthily that which is effected or produced by itself (*id quod a se ipso efficitur sive producitur*). Therefore we may analyse or rearrange the definition in question in the following manner.

The definiendum = cause of itself (*causa sui*).

The implicit definiens = efficient cause of itself (*causa efficiens sui ipsius*).

The explicit definiens = that whose essence involves existence, *or* that whose nature cannot be conceived except as existing (*id, cujus essentia involvit existentiam, sive id, cujus natura non potest concipi, nisi existens*).

1) In April of 2008 the Spinoza Society of Japan gave me an occasion to make a speech under the title "The *Causa Sui* Controversy and Spinozism" at Osaka University. This paper is a modified version of part of that speech, which was made in Japanese.

2) The original Latin text (O. L.): "Per causam sui intelligo id, cujus essentia involvit existentiam, sive id, cujus natura non potest concipi, nisi existens" (G II, p. 45).

If Spinoza had intended to determine a more or less lexicographical meaning of the definiendum in this definition, he should have connected it with the *implicit* definiens although the definition in that case would have not been informative at all. (And in that case, if Spinoza's sense of style had been unable to bear that uninformativeness, he should have omitted the definition after all.) However, the definiendum and the *explicit* definiens are connected in actual fact. Therefore we must say that Spinoza's intention in this definition was not to explain the meaning of the definiendum lexicographically. In other words, the logical status of this definition must be considered not as a more or less lexicographical explanation but as an axiom or more specifically an exposition of a certain metaphysical stance.

My interpretation is that Spinoza intended with the definition of *causa sui*, that is the very first statement in his most important writing, to expose unambiguously his metaphysical position regarding the controversy about *causa sui*, in which several important philosophers or theologians, such as Descartes, Arnauld and Clauberg, engaged from 1640s to 1650s. To put my interpretation differently, Spinoza was fully aware that his definition of *causa sui* should be an unambiguous sign of his reaction to the Causa Sui Controversy for the contemporary readers of his *Ethics*. The aim of this paper is to make this interpretation as persuasive as possible.

II

The notion of Causa Sui was not invented by Spinoza. He learned it from a controversy that took place from 1640s to 1650s about the consistency of the notion Causa Sui and the appropriateness of regarding God as Causa Sui. There were two parties in the controversy. In one of them we find René Descartes (1596–1650) and, after Descartes' death, Johannes Clauberg (1622–1665), and in the other Johannes Caterus (c. 1590–1655), Antoine Arnauld (1612–1694) and Jacobus Revius (1586–1658). In this section I will survey how the controversy was started.

The main text of Descartes' metaphysical masterpiece *Meditations on First Philosophy* had been completed by the summer of 1640. Descartes planned to annex to it objections by several prominent philosophers or theologians as well as his replies to them. As a result, six sets of objections and replies were published together with the main text in 1641.

The First Set of Objections was by a Catholic theologian from Holland, Johannes Caterus. One of Caterus' assertions was that the notion "esse a se", with which Descartes described God in his Third Meditation, should be understood not in the positive sense of being caused by himself

but in the negative sense of not being caused by anything else. To this remark Descartes reacts sensitively in his First Set of Replies, saying, "I did not say that it was impossible for something to be the efficient cause of itself" (CSM II, p. 78)³. Indeed, Descartes admits that it would be trivially false for something to be the efficient cause of itself as long as the notion of efficient causality was to be understood to imply the conditions of temporal succession and numeral distinctness of cause and effect.⁴ But he replies that the notion of efficient causality should not be understood to be restricted by those conditions. According to Descartes, the most important point about the notion of efficient causality is the Principle of Efficient Causation, namely: "if anything exists we may always ask why it exists; that is, we may inquire into its efficient cause, or, if it does not have one, we may demand why it does not need one" (CSM II, p. 78 [AT VII, p. 108]). And this Principle of Efficient Causation is valid universally, so applicable even to God. Hence Descartes says: "I do readily admit that there can exist something which possesses such great and inexhaustible power that it never required the assistance of anything else in order to exist in the first place, and does not now require any assistance for its preservation, so that it is, in a sense, its own cause; and I understand God to be such a thing." (CSM II, p. 78 [AT VII p. 109]). And he says: "we are quite entitled to think that in a sense he stands in the same relation to himself as an efficient cause does to its effect, and hence that he derives his existence from himself in the positive sense" (CSM II p. 80 [AT VII p. 111]).

In this way the notion of *Causa Sui*, which had never been used explicitly in the main text of the *Meditations*, made its first appearance in the First Set of Replies as a description applicable uniquely to God.

III

When Antoine Arnauld wrote the Fourth Set of Objections, he had read not only the main text of the *Meditations* but also the First Set of Replies. In his objections Arnauld treated many subjects, one of which was the problem about the notion of *Causa Sui*. I will survey Arnauld's argument on this problem.

Before Arnauld deals with the appropriateness of regarding God as *Causa Sui*, he asserts that the notion of *Causa Sui* itself is inconsistent, because he thinks that the notion of efficient

3) O.L.: "non dixi impossibile esse ut aliquid sit causa efficiens sui ipsius" (AT, VII, p. 108).

4) In this paper the condition of temporal succession of cause and effect shall be abbreviated as Temporality Condition and the condition of numeral distinctness of them as Distinctness Condition.

cause implies the Distinctness Condition. “Since every effect depends on a cause and receives its existence from a cause, surely it is clear that one and the same thing cannot depend on itself or receive its existence from itself. ... a relation must involve two terms.” (CSM II, p. 147 [AT VII 209–210]).

Arnauld proceeds to criticize Descartes’ assertion that the Principle of Efficient Causation is applicable even to God, saying: “... the question of why God should continue in existence cannot be asked without absurdity, since the question manifestly involves the notions of ‘before’ and ‘after’, past and future, which should be excluded from the concept of an infinite being” (CMS II, pp. 148–149 [AT VII p. 211]). Namely, according to Arnauld the efficient causality, which should be understood to imply the Temporality Condition, is in no way applicable to God, a being surpassing the concept of time. And he adds: “... it belongs to the essence of an infinite being that it exists ... no less than it belongs to the essence of a triangle to have its three angles equal to two right angles” (CMS II, p. 149 [AT VII p. 212]). In this way Arnauld maintains that God’s existence should never be understood in terms of his efficient cause but solely in terms of his nature or essence.

And Arnauld concludes his objection against Descartes’ argument about the notion of Causa Sui with the following harsh sentence: “I am sure that it will scarcely be possible to find a single theologian who will not object to the proposition that God derives his existence from himself in the positive sense, and as it were causally” (CSM II, p. 150 [AT VII p. 214]). Thus he maintains that in view of the Christian theological orthodoxy it is improper to explain the existence of God in terms of efficient causality.

Now Descartes replies to Arnauld’s objections against the notion of Causa Sui, in many pages of the Fourth Set of Replies. Below I will extract highly relevant passages from his replies.

A M. Arnauld says that it is ‘a hard saying, and indeed false’ to suggest that God is the efficient cause of himself; but I actually denied that suggestion (CSM II, p. 164 [AT VII, p. 235])

B ... I did believe in the existence of something that does not need an efficient cause. And what could that be, but God? (CSM II, p. 165 [AT VII, p. 236])

C ... the inexhaustible power of God is the cause or reason for his not needing a

cause. And since that inexhaustible power or immensity of the divine essence is as *positive* as can be, I said that the reason or cause why God needs no cause is a *positive* reason or cause. (CSM II, p. 165 [AT VII, p. 236])

D I hope that even M. Arnauld will not deny that the immensity of the power in virtue of which God needs no cause in order to exist is a *positive* thing in God, and that nothing which is similarly positive can be understood to exist in any other thing in such a way that it does not need an efficient cause in order to exist. (CSM II, p. 165 [AT VII, p. 237])

E The fact that the second restriction [= the Distinctness Condition] cannot also be deleted implies merely that a cause which is not distinct from its effects is not an efficient cause in the strict sense, and this I admit. It does not, however, follow that such a cause is in no sense a positive cause that can be regarded as analogous to an efficient cause; and this is all that my argument requires. (CSM II, p. 167 [AT VII, p. 240])

F ... the answer to the question why God exists should be given not in terms of an efficient cause in the strict sense, but simply in terms of the essence or formal cause of the thing. And precisely because in the case of God there is no distinction between existence and essence, the formal cause will be strongly analogous to an efficient cause, and hence can be called something close to an efficient cause. (CSM II p. 170 [AT VII, p. 243])

In the passages cited above Descartes concedes that God has no efficient cause in the proper sense and that God is not strictly the efficient cause of himself. Then, may we say that this concession of Descartes' can resolve the conflict existing between Descartes on the one hand and Caterus and Arnauld on the other hand about the notion of *Causa Sui*? By no means. The essential point of their *Causa Sui* controversy is different from the question whether or not God may be called the efficient cause of himself in the proper sense of the term.

IV

By inquiring Descartes' text in detail, we can realize that the reason why Descartes concedes that God is not strictly the efficient cause of himself is reduced to his agreeing that the notion of efficient causality implies the Distinctness Condition. Just because this condition cannot be deleted from the notion of efficient causality Descartes admits that strictly speaking there is no efficient cause of itself.⁵⁾ However, the question whether or not the efficient causality implies the Distinctness Condition was no important matter for Caterus and Arnauld when they objected to Descartes.

Here I would like to attend to Jean-Luc Marion's argument in his paper "Entre analogie et principe de raison: la *causa sui*" (= Marion, 1994). According to Marion, "D'Anselme à Suarez, l'accord se fait donc sur un principe reçu et commun: «... nihil potest efficere se»" (Marion, 1994, p. 312). In other words, "Les prédécesseurs de Descartes tiennent donc la *causa sui* impensable" (idem.). And we find in Suarez's *Disputationes metaphysicae* almost the same argument as that of Caterus and Arnauld about the Divine Aseity. Suarez says: "Nam quod dicitur ex se vel a se esse, licet positivum hoc esse videatur, tamen solam negationem addit ipsi enti, nam ens non potest esse a se per positivam originem et emanationem (...) et hunc modum exponendi sunt aliqui Sancti, cum dicunt Deum sibi causam sui esse, vel substantiae suae aut sapientiae" (op.cit., p. 311–312).

What mattered to Caterus and Arnauld is condensed in this very citation from Suarez. In other words, what they intended to say to Descartes after all was that the Aseity of God (Deus esse a se) should not be understood in any positive sense because understanding it so would relegate God into the sphere of the Principle of Efficient Causation, that is to say the sphere of created things. On the other hand, Descartes did not show any sign of concession about how to understand the Divine Aseity. Namely, it was Descartes' firm position that the immense essence of God is something positive and that this positive thing is the positive reason why God needs no efficient cause in order to exist. Taking this aspect into consideration, we can clearly see that this controversy should not be simplified to a certain sort of concept analysis. In essence they were not concerned about the question whether the efficient causality involves the Distinctness Condition or the Temporality Condition. Their essential point of dispute lies in

5) Cf. the citation E in the preceding section.

whether the Aseity of the Divine Existence should be understood positively or negatively, and on this point Descartes on the one hand and Caterus and Arnauld on the other hand remained as far as ever all through the period of their controversy. Therefore we are totally unable to imagine that Caterus and Arnauld were satisfied with the replies Descartes showed to them. The fact that Descartes admitted that God is not the cause of himself in the proper sense should have been no consolation for them. The reason of this admittance of Descartes' is, as we have seen above, reduced after all to the Distinctness Condition being implied by the notion of efficient causality, and either of the Distinctness Condition or the Temporality Condition should have been a subsidiary, if not trivial, matter to Caterus and Arnauld. The reason why Descartes' argument about the notion of *Causa Sui* impressed them as quite scandalous lied in the fact that Descartes understood the Divine Aseity positively and hence, in their eyes, relegated God to the sphere of created things. Therefore as long as Descartes did not change his view about the Divine Aseity, the text and the meaning of his argument should have looked split apart to Caterus and Arnauld; that is to say, they should have said to themselves: "True, outwardly Descartes denied God being the efficient cause of himself in the proper sense, but that concession is nothing but a screen for his true intention, and inwardly he affirmed God to be the efficient cause of himself".

V

Two prominent examples of intense Anti-Cartesian movements in the Netherlands in 1640s are the so-called Utrecht Crisis (1641–3) and Leiden Crisis (1647). The former was launched by the theologian Gysbertus Voetius (1589–1676) and the latter by Revius. One of the Cartesian arguments which Revius attacked in Leiden Crisis was about the notion of *Causa Sui*.

Revius once lived in Deventer, where he met Descartes several times mediated by their common friend Henricus Reneri (1593–1639). Already in the *Suarez repurgatus* of 1643 he had inserted criticisms against Descartes, and in 1647 he started a full-dress campaign against the Cartesian philosophy in a series of disputations organized at Leiden University. The fourth and fifth of the disputations dealt with the notion of *Causa Sui*, and the gist of the criticism developed there was fundamentally the same as that of Caterus and Arnauld, that is to say the assertion that Descartes considered God as *Causa Sui* by understanding the Divine Aseity positively and that this consideration is blasphemous (cf. Revius, 1647, pp. 89–108).

Descartes responded to this criticism of Revius in his *Notae in programma* of 1648.

More specifically, he annexed to the *Notae*, which was originally intended as a thorough-going objection to the *Programma* by his ex-pupil Henricus Regius (1598–1679), a response to Revius' criticism. I will cite the relevant passage below.

... I have never written that God should be called 'efficient cause of himself not just in a negative sense but also in a positive sense'.... However carefully he sifts, scans and pores over my writings, he will not find in them anything like this – quite the reverse in fact. Anyone who has read my writings, or has any knowledge of me, or at least does not think me utterly silly, knows that I am totally opposed to such extravagant views. (CSM I, p. 310 [AT VIII-2, pp. 368–369])

In the same year as Descartes' *Notae* came out, Revius published the *Methodi cartesianae consideratio theologica*. With this he intended to criticise Descartes' *Discourse on the Method* paragraph by paragraph, but in the pages he did not forget to insert again the assertion to the effect that Descartes regarded God as Causa Sui by understanding His Aseity in the positive sense⁶⁾.

VI

In 1652, before long after Descartes' death, Clauberg, one of the representative Cartesians of the time, published a voluminous book entitled *Defensio cartesiana*. This is a counterattack against Revius' *Methodi cartesianae*, hence a defense of Descartes' methodology in particular, but we can find in its Chapter 23 a passage to the effect that Descartes never asserted that God is effected by himself positively⁷⁾. Reacting to the *Defensio cartesiana* Revius published in 1653 the *Thekel, hoc est levitas defensionis Cartesianae*, in which he attacked Clauberg's counterattack by referring to arguments in his own previous writings⁸⁾.

No doubt Revius was fully conscious that Descartes denied explicitly God to be the cause of himself in the positive sense in the Fourth Set of Replies⁹⁾. Then why did Revius continue to object to Clauberg, who attempted to defend Descartes by citing Descartes' words in his

6) Cf. Aza Goudriaan, 2002, p. 56.

7) Cf. Clauberg, 1968, II, p. 1014.

8) Cf. Aza Goudriaan, 2002, p. 57.

9) On this denial, see e.g. the citation A in Section III of this paper.

replies to Arnauld? The reason must be that the same gulf between Caterus/Arnauld and Descartes existed also between Revius and Descartes. In other words, the essential reason why Descartes' argument about the notion of *Causa Sui* looked scandalous not only to Caterus/Arnauld but also to Revius was the one fact that Descartes understood the Divine Aseity in the positive sense. However tenaciously Descartes might have denied God to be the cause of himself in the proper sense, his denial was only a screen in the eyes of Caterus, Arnauld and Revius and they considered Descartes to be practically affirming God to be the cause of himself. It was quite natural for Clauberg, who was anxious to defend Descartes, to fight against them by citing Descartes' words, but those words meant nothing but a screen for Revius and he wanted to assert that he was able to see Descartes' real intention through that screen. Thus in the Netherlands from the end of 1640s to 1650s the *Causa Sui* Controversy turned into a barren and endless dispute.

It was just at this period that Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677) met Cartesianism through the contact with Collegiant friends and studied Latin and the New Philosophy at the Latin school administrated by Franciscus van den Enden (1602–1674). On July 27, 1656, Spinoza was excommunicated from the Jewish community of Amsterdam on the ground of his “abominable heresies” and “monstrous deeds” (Nadler, 1999, p. 120). Steven Nadler suggested that the Anti-Cartesian movement then existing in the Netherlands had to do with Spinoza's excommunication. Utrecht Crisis occurred in 1643 and Leiden Crisis in 1647. And according to Nadler's conjecture, in 1656 the Dutch Anti-Cartesian movement had its third peak, and the Jewish community of Amsterdam had to excommunicate Spinoza in order to demonstrate their Anti-Cartesian attitude to the Dutch authorities¹⁰. If this was the case, Spinoza's excommunication may be called Amsterdam Crisis. In any case, it is safe to say that at the moment of his excommunication Spinoza was fully aware of the intellectual conditions about Cartesianism of his days. Also, in Section 92 of the *Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect*, which is now regarded as the earliest work by Spinoza, the author writes: “If the thing is in itself, *or*, as is commonly said, is the cause of itself, then it must be understood through its essence alone” (Curley, pp. 38–39)¹¹. Taking into consideration the expression “as is commonly said”, it is quite natural to suppose that Spinoza knew of the *Causa Sui* Controversy by the end of 1650s. Further, it is an obvious fact that Spinoza owned in his library a copy of the Dutch translation of

10) Cf. Nadler, 1999, pp. 151–152.

11) O. L.: “si res sit in se, sive, ut vulgo dicitur, causa sui, tum per solam suam essentiam debebit intelligi” (G, II, p. 34).

Clauberg's *Defensio cartesiana* mentioned above¹²⁾. Therefore we are able to say with very little fear of mistake that Spinoza watched at point-blank range the Causa Sui Controversy which I have just surveyed.

VII

I repeat that Spinoza's definition of the notion Causa Sui is *prima facie* strange because it seems unnecessary to define that notion. Those who knew of the Causa Sui Controversy, among whom Spinoza himself must be counted as I explained in the preceding section, should have known clearly that the notion means an efficient cause of itself (*causa efficiens sui ipsius*). Notwithstanding Spinoza dared to define the notion of Causa Sui. And what is more perplexing is the fact that the definiens is not "efficient cause of itself (*causa efficiens sui ipsius*)". How can we understand the true intention of this *prima facie* strange definition?

First, it is now abundantly clear that Spinoza did not intend to determine the more or less lexicographical meaning of the notion of Causa Sui. The definiens in the actual definition was not in accordance with the common sense of those who knew of the Causa Sui Controversy. Therefore we must say that Spinoza intended to show more than the common sense meaning of the notion of Causa Sui. Second, the definiens in the actual definition, namely, "that whose essence involves existence, *or* that whose nature cannot be conceived except as existing" means nothing but God for all those who engaged in the Causa Sui Controversy. For example, Descartes says in the Fifth Meditation: "from the fact that I cannot think of God except as existing, it follows that existence is inseparable from God, and hence that he really exists" (CSM II, p. 46 [AT VII, p. 67]). Also, Arnauld says in the Fourth Set of Objections: "it belongs to the essence of an infinite being that it exists ... no less than it belongs to the essence of a triangle to have its three angles equal to two right angles" (CSM II, p. 149 [AT VII, p. 212]). Therefore Spinoza must be judged to expose unambiguously his stance about the essential theme of the Causa Sui Controversy, that is to say the appropriateness of regarding God as the efficient cause of himself. And needless to say, with this definition Spinoza maintains that it is appropriate to regard God as the efficient cause of himself.

Spinoza knew that the Causa Sui Controversy turned into a barren dispute in 1650s. And he intended to refuse to take over that barren dispute in his own metaphysical argument. In

12) Cf. Spinoza, 1999, p. 684.

other words, he wanted to make his own position as clear as possible about the *Causa Sui* Controversy. That is why he placed the definition of the notion of *Causa Sui* at the very beginning of the *Ethics* and there equated the notion of *Causa Sui* with a description which designated nothing but God for all the members who engaged in the *Causa Sui* Controversy. In that way Spinoza declared that he not only understood the Divine Aseity in the positive sense (like Descartes) but also regarded God as the efficient cause of himself in the proper sense (unlike Descartes). Therefore the logical status of this definition is not so much a simple definition as an axiom or more specifically an exposition of a certain metaphysical stance.

Now we are able to realize that Spinoza's definition of the notion of *Causa Sui* has both a Cartesian sense and a non-Cartesian sense. Its Cartesian sense is that Spinoza declares that he will follow Descartes in understanding the Divine Aseity positively. Its non-Cartesian sense is that Spinoza declares that he will make no use of the screen that Arnauld and Revius should have felt in Descartes' argument all through the *Causa Sui* Controversy. In Spinoza's conception of efficient causality, neither the Temporality Condition nor the Distinctness Condition is taken into consideration. God is the efficient cause of himself in the proper sense of the term. And that means that the Principle of Efficient Causation is completed after all, because that principle now proclaims about everything existing not only that it should be possible to ask about the cause of its existence but also that there should be the cause of its existence¹³⁾. In this way Spinoza's God, unlike Descartes', is no more a Being transcending efficient causality.

The fact that Part One of Spinoza's *Ethics* has no preface has been somewhat perplexing to Spinoza scholars. It begins abruptly with the definition of the notion of *Causa Sui*. But now, it is abundantly clear that the definition is much more than a simple definition. It is

13) The completion of the Principle of Efficient Causation has been implicitly and partly anticipated in the *Descartes' Principles of Philosophy*. In the *Descartes' Principles* Spinoza reproduces most of the axioms given by Descartes in the Geometrical Exposition at the end of the *Second Set of Replies*, and then Spinoza presents Descartes' Axiom 1 (= Descartes' Principle of Efficient Causation) as Axiom 11. However, Spinoza's Axiom 11 is much shorter than Descartes' Axiom 1. I will cite both axioms below. The second sentence in Descartes' Axiom 1, which qualifies the Principle of Efficient Causation explicitly, is completely deleted in Spinoza's Axiom 11.

Descartes' Axiom 1: Concerning every existing thing it is possible to ask what is the cause of its existence. This question may even be asked concerning God, not because he needs any cause in order to exist, but because the immensity of his nature is the cause or reason why he needs no cause in order to exist. (CSM II, p. 116 [AT VII, pp. 164–165])

Spinoza's Axiom 11: Nothing exists of which it cannot be asked, what is the cause, or reason, why it exists. See Descartes' Axiom 1. (Curley, 1985, p. 246 [G I, p. 158])

rather a decisive exposition of a certain metaphysical stance. And it will not be too much to say that the definition is so rich in metaphysical implication that it may compensate, partly at least, for the very absence of a preface.

Bibliography

Descartes' text

- AT = Adam, Charles; Tannery, Paul (eds.) (1964–1974): *Œuvres de Descartes*, 12 vols. (CNRS).
CSM = Cottingham, John; Stoothoff, Robert; Murdoch, Dugald (trs.) (1985): *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, 2 vols. (Cambridge University Press).

Spinoza's text

- G = Gebhardt, Carl (ed.) (1925): *Spinoza Opera*, 4 vols., (Heidelberg: Carl Winter).
Curley = Curley, Edwin (ed., tr.) (1985): *The Collected Works of Spinoza*, Vol. 1 (Princeton University Press).
Beyssade, Jean-Marie; Marion, Jean-Luc (eds.) (1994): *Descartes — Objecter et répondre* (Presses Universitaires de France).
Clauberg, Johann (1968): *Opera Omnia Philosophica*, 2 vols. (Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung).
Goudriaan, Aza (2002): “Introduction” to Revis (1647).
Marion, Jean-Luc (1994), “Entre analogie et principe de raison: la *causa sui*”, in Beyssade et Marion (1994).
Nadler, Steven (1999): *Spinoza, A Life* (Cambridge University Press).
Revis, Jacobus (1647): *A Theological Examination of Cartesian Philosophy*, edited by Aza Goudriaan (Brill, 2002).
Spinoza, Benedictus de (1999): *Ethique*, présenté, traduit et commenté par Bernard Pautrat (Editions du Seuil).