@article{oai:shudo-u.repo.nii.ac.jp:00000612,
 author = {石井 , 善洋 and イシイ , ヨシヒロ and Ishii , Yoshihiro},
 issue = {2},
 journal = {広島修大論集. 人文編},
 month = {Mar},
 note = {P(論文), In his Dictionary of the English Language, Samuel Johnson defines 'genius' as 'disposition of nature by which any one is qualified for some peculiar employment'. Clearly his moral intention is reflected in this definition describing genius as some good quality not limited to particular people. We find his motivation for doing it in his attacks on the theory of ruling passion, which claims that we have 'an original direction of desire to some particular object; an innate affection, which gives all action a determinate and invariable tendency (Pope, AMS Press, vol.8. 293)'. On this theory 'genius' is an innate, determinate and invariable faculty directed to some particular object. But if we accept this definition, argues Johnson, 'to him whose genius is not adapted to the study which he prosecutes, all labour shall be vain and fruitless (Yale, III. 139)', because the 'determinate and invariable tendency' of action rules out the possibility of improving ability. The belief he finds atthe root of this theory is 'a kind of moral predestination' (Pope, 293), which he condemns as harmful to young scholars who need encouragement to work hard. Johnson considers that the theory is contrary to facts, and erroneous, because a tendency is by no means 'determinate and invariable'. He observes that character is subject to alteration through various influences we receive in life. To prove this, he gives the examples of the love of money, patriotism, and so on. These feelings never result from a natural ruling passion, but from the education and other influences of the society we live in. And a state of society, he affirms, is entirely different from a state of nature. From his remarks we can infer his theory against the idea of predestination: the notion of an innate tendency or faculty is imaginary. We are likely to get it when we look back and try to find the cause of action in its preceding events, believing how matters come is unavoidably determined by the matters prior to them. We are then under the impression that events are produced by the direct causation. His criticism stems from an insight into the psychological process of the second-guessing which is involved in forming predestinate ideas. He warns of it by saying, 'By trusting to impressions, a man may gradually come to yield to them, and at length be subject to them, so as not to be a free agent, or what is the same thing in effect, to suppose that he is not a free agent' (Life, Oxford, 1159; italics, Boswell's). Keeping this discussion in mind, we notice that Johnson excludes all the hints of predestination from his moral essays and emphasises the key role of accidents played in the choice of employment and the discovery of a spark of genius, etc. He asserts that 'the true genius is a mind of large general powers, accidentally determined to some particular direction' (Cowley, AMS Press, vol.7.1-2; italics, mine). If an accident is a key factor to determine powers in some direction, young scholars never know for certain whether they have a faculty or not. To find one they have to try all the fields of study. However, Johnson warns them that it is not wise to spend too much time of the important part of life in that way, for it is like expecting accidents to come. Instead he reminds them that 'steadiness and perseverance' are still more important in achieving a great project, because it is only labour and industry that can make the tiny spark of genius bigger and stronger. In this sense, genius is an acquired ability after a long period of industry. In fact, nobody can call the initial spark a sign of 'genius' until they assess their achievement after the project is over, because the notion of genius, as well as that of an innate tendency, is imaginary, and cannot be referred to as real until they can see its result. In his moral essays, Johnson gives the examples of people who fail in achieving their academic ends for various psychological reasons. In most cases their belief in genius interacts with 'complacency', 'habitual idleness', 'the love of himself, 'hope' and so on. All of these take hold of their mind, and consequently prevent them from pursuing the ends with 'unshaken perseverance'. The direction of genius may be determined by accidents, to be sure, but to rely on genius or an innate faculty in achieving a great project is like to rely on accidents to do that. Johnson considers that a great achievement is the result of labour and industry. They are the only means to realise the true self, or more properly, to develop the self one by one, because if genius is an acquired ability after a long period of industry, the true self of genius is also the self that we can acquire after a long period of industry. The reason why Johnson places labour and industry at the centre of his precepts on learning is that he intends to give us the surest means to be free from the power of accidents and become the master of ourselves. In this respect, his thought on learning is not only instructive, but also highly moral.},
 pages = {91--112},
 title = {サミュエル・ジョンソンの思想: その分析と再構成 : 学問について},
 volume = {39},
 year = {1999},
 yomi = {イシイ, ヨシヒロ}
}